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Abstract
Background: The European Union member countries reacted differently to the 2008 economic and financial crisis.
However, few countries have monitored the outcomes of their policy responses, and there is therefore little evidence
as to whether or not savings undermined the performance of health systems. We discuss the situation in Portugal,
where a financial adjustment program was implemented between 2011 and 2014, and explore the views of health
workers on the effects of austerity measures on quality of care delivery.
Methods: A nationwide survey of physicians’ experiences was conducted in 2013–2014 (n= 3442). We used a two-step
model to compare public and private services and look at the possible moderating effects of the physicians’ specialty and
years of practice. Our data analysis included descriptive statistics, the independent t test, analysis of variance (ANOVA),
multivariate logistic regression, General Linear Model Univariate Analysis, non-parametric methods (bootstrap), and post hoc
probing.
Results: Mainly in the public sector, the policy goal of maintaining quality of care was undermined by a lack of resources,
the deterioration in medical residency conditions, and to a lesser extent, greater administrative interference in
clinical decision-making. Differences in public and private services showed that the effects of the austerity measures were
not the same throughout the health system. Our results also showed that physicians with similar years of practice and in
the same medical specialty did not necessarily experience the same pressures.
Conclusions: The debate on the effects of austerity measures should focus more closely on health workers’ concrete
experiences, as they demonstrate the non-linearity between policy setting and expected outcomes. We also suggest
that it is necessary to explore the interplay between lower quality and the undermining of trust relationships in health.
Keywords: Portugal, Economic crisis, Adjustment programs, Austerity measures, Quality of care, Trust
Background
Crises and health system performance: where do we
stand in the debate?
How health services are planned, purchased, and deliv-
ered has a direct impact on the key dimensions of health
system performance, i.e., efficiency, quality, and access
[1]. In the aftermath of the economic and financial crisis
that hit most member countries of the European Union,
the question is raised of whether the impact of cuts in
public funding and other austerity measures had neutral
effects or have undermined the performance of health
services [2].
As the crisis grew in intensity, the WHO Regional Of-
fice for Europe [3] recommended that member states
monitor the effects of their policy responses on health
indicators. Few countries did so, and existing assess-
ments have focused mainly on measuring changes in ac-
cess and efficiency, thus the need for further evidence
on the dimension of quality of care delivery [4].
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The analysis of health services delivery needs to take
into account that the operation of provider organizations
is more complex than assumed by political decision-
makers [5]. This premise is based on the neo-
institutional literature that argues that macro-level pol-
icies are affected by workplace-level contingencies that
produce “perverse or non-expected” effects [6, 7].
This has received little attention in the debates on the
effects on the quality of health services of political
responses to the crisis. This paper is a contribution to
the debate through a deeper look at how different levels
of care, e.g., hospital and primary care, and the internal
stratification of the medical profession, e.g., by specialty
and years of service, constitute such contingencies [8–10].
That may explain why various categories of physicians,
working in different environments, have reacted differently
to the pressures generated by policy responses to the crisis.
Additionally, although public services have been the
main target of austerity measures, complementarity with
the private sector and growing pressure for marketization
in many countries [11] raises the issue of understanding
better how private providers have adapted to the eco-
nomic crisis. There has not yet been systematic research
into this matter even though some authors suggest that
public regulation can be less effective in monitoring and
penalizing for-profit investors for patient selection [12].
The situation in Portugal
In 2011, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between
the Portuguese Government and the International Monet-
ary Fund, The European Central Bank, and the European
Commission designed a €78 billion, 3-year financial adjust-
ment program with specific timelines and policy targets to
reduce the budget deficit from 9.8 to 3% of GDP in 2013.
Cost containment in the health sector was considered feas-
ible without undermining the quality of services [13]. Direct
cuts in the health sector were initially estimated at €550
million. However, they doubled after 1 year and reached
€1.3 billion in 2013 [14].
Specific health-related policies were aimed at different
targets: more cost-sharing, better drug-market regula-
tion, tighter control over physicians’ prescribing and of
the management of public provider organizations, more
transparent public-private partnership, expansion of pri-
mary health care services, and savings on workforce
costs. Table 1 shows the extent to which these objectives
were achieved.
Overall, the massive reduction in public expenditure
came more from cost-sharing, tighter drug-market regu-
lation, control over prescribing, and of the management
of provider organizations. Improvements in public-
private partnership, better access to primary healthcare,
and workforce changes contributed to a lesser extent.
Available studies of the effects of those reductions have
focused mainly on efficiency and access [15] and plan-
ning and purchasing of services [16, 17].
Objectives of the study
The aim of this research is to provide more evidence
about the effects of an adjustment program on the qual-
ity of healthcare. Its contribution to the debate is three-
fold. First, quality needs to be considered as important
as efficiency and access. Second, it highlights to what
extent an analysis of delivery of healthcare requires look-
ing at different sources of information than those on
planning and purchasing of services. Health workers’
daily experiences are a rich source of information in this
regard [18]. Third, it presents comparisons between and
within the public and private sectors, a neglected aspect in
research on policy responses to economic crises in Europe.
Methods
Study design and participants
A two-step model (Fig. 1) was designed to describe the
experiences of physicians working in public and private
services (main-effect model) and analyze variations
between the two groups based on years of experience
and specialty (model with moderated effects). All types
of public providers were included in the public sector, as
were for-profit and professional-based insurers in the
private sector.
Data was collected in a national survey asking physicians
about their experiences after 2011, when the financial
adjustment program began. A structured, self-administered
questionnaire was sent by post from May 2013 to January
2014 to all physicians registered with the Portuguese
Medical Council (N = 43,874). The key aim was to reach as
many physicians as possible with no previous criteria
underpinning the selection of cases. A total of 3442 ques-
tionnaires from physicians practicing in Portugal at that
time were returned and validated through consistency and
readability analysis. Even though it is one of the largest
national-level databases of physicians in Europe, it was not
possible to define a probabilistic sample of practicing physi-
cians in Portugal because (i) there are no standardized data
on the number of doctors who have retired or emigrated or
on their distribution by sector or type of medical services
and (ii) confidentiality criteria imposed by the Medical
Council’s ethics committee prevented us from collecting
the respondents’ age or geographical location.
Measures
Dependent variables
Quality of care is analyzed in different ways depending
on disciplinary backgrounds [19]. The analysis adopted
here lay in a structure-process link, as it was intended to
ascertain whether reforms changed how care was actu-
ally delivered [20]. Given that the questionnaire was sent
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Table 1 Implementation of the MoU in Portugal 2011–2014
Policy outcome
Accomplished Partially
accomplished
Not
accomplished
Withdrawn/
omitted
Cost sharing Review and increase patient fees x
Reduction of exemption categories x
Increase inflation-indexed fees x
Cut tax allowances for healthcare, including private
insurance
x
Reduce the cost of health benefits schemes for public
servants
x
Reduce costs for patient transportation x
Regulation of the drug
market
Control retail price x
Move the responsibility of pricing to the Ministry of Health x
Revise the international reference-pricing system x
Monitor expenditure monthly and limit public spending x
Remove barriers to generic medicines x
Change the calculation of pharmacies’ profit margin x
Gradually increase the share of generic medicines x
Implement existing legislation on the regulation of
pharmacies
x
Speed up the reimbursement of generics x
Introduce a contribution paid by pharmacies x
Control of doctors’
prescription
Make electronic prescription of medicines and diagnostic
tests covered by public reimbursement fully compulsory
for physicians (public and private sectors)
x
Encourage physicians to prescribe generic medicines and
less costly branded products (public and private sectors)
x
Introduce international prescription guidelines for drugs,
exams and treatment
x
Improve monitoring of prescription of medicines and
diagnostic services and impose systematic assessments
by each doctor of quantity and cost. Introduce sanctions
and penalties
x
Control of operating
costs and performance
in the NHS
Legislative and administrative framework for a centralized
procurement system for the purchase of medical goods
x
Change in the existing accounting framework in hospitals SOEs
to that of private companies and other SOEs
x
Concentration and rationalization of non-hospital care provision x
Concentration and rationalization of the hospital network x
Continued publication of clinical guidelines and introduction of
an auditing system
x
Benchmarking of hospital performance x
Interoperability of IT systems in hospitals x
Finalization and regular updates of uniform coding system for
medical supplies
x
Implement the centralized purchasing of medical goods using
the uniform coding system
x
Clearing of existing arrears in the hospital sector and prevention
of accumulation of new arrears
x
Completion of patient electronic medical records x
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to all registered physicians, we had to find suitable ways
of comparing people in different positions and work-
place settings. Therefore, the structure-process analysis
was empirically driven according to the implementation
of the MoU in Portugal from 2011 to 2014. Quality of
care was addressed in terms of changes physicians said
they had experienced in three key aspects of their daily
practice: control of prescriptions, operating costs, and
performance, as detailed in Table 1. Six dependent vari-
ables (DVs) were defined as follows:
-Administrative interference in decision making, i.e.,
less autonomy in physicians’ decision-making in favor
of organizational control: more rejections of innovative
treatments (DV1), pressure to choose cheaper treat-
ments exerted by the administration (DV4), and
pressure not to prescribe certain drugs exerted by
the administration (DV5)
-Insufficient resources, i.e., possible limitation of
material resources for the provision of care: regular
shortages of supplies (gloves, masks, needles, etc.)
(DV2) and regular shortages of drugs (DV3)
-Deterioration in medical residency, i.e., organizational
changes that directly affected physicians’ advanced
training: less favorable conditions for medical
residencies (DV6) (e.g., overworked residents and less
time for tutors’ work)
The list of questions was preceded by: “Based on your
personal experience and in comparison to 2011”, and
dichotomous dummy variables were defined with the
Table 1 Implementation of the MoU in Portugal 2011–2014 (Continued)
Policy outcome
Accomplished Partially
accomplished
Not
accomplished
Withdrawn/
omitted
Public-private
relationship
Increase in competition between private providers and
reduction in NHS payment of exams and treatments
x
Centralized monitoring of public-private partnership contracts x
Regular revision of fees paid by the NHS for exams and
treatment by private providers
x
Assessment of compliance with European competition rules
for the provision of services in the private healthcare sector
x
Access to healthcare Reinforce
primary health
care
Increase the number of patients per primary
care unit/family doctor
x
Increase the number of primary care units
using salary and performance-related
payments
x
Separate HR from hospitals and reconsider
the role of nurses and other professionals
x
Review geographical distribution of GPs x
Move hospital outpatient services to primary care units x
Workforce Update working time, increase mobility, adopt flexible time
arrangements and review payment mechanisms
x
Conduct an annual inventory of doctors x
Make human resource allocation plans x
Increase mobility of healthcare staff within and between
regions
x
Ensure transparent selection of the chairs and members
of hospital boards
x
Legend: Own elaboration from [26, 27]
Fig. 1 Analytical model
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answer “no” as a reference category (0). The proportion
of “yes” answers was also used to make group
comparisons.
Independent variables
The sector was analyzed at two levels: physicians work-
ing exclusively for the National Health Service (NHS) or
exclusively in the private sector. The NHS included hos-
pitals and primary health care and the private sector
included small offices, clinics, and private hospitals.
Moderator variables
Years of practice meant the length of time physicians had
been registered with the Medical Council (a compulsory
requirement after post-graduate medical training). They
were measured in months as a quantitative variable.
The 21 selected medical specialties (of a total of 41)
were those of physicians working exclusively in the
NHS or exclusively in the private sector. These were com-
bined as follows: anesthesiology, cardiology, dermatology,
gastroenterology, general practice/family medicine, gen-
eral surgery, internal medicine, neurology, obstetrics and
gynecology, oncology (medical and radiation oncology),
ophthalmology, orthopedics, other surgical specialties
(angiology and vascular, cardiothoracic, maxillofacial,
pediatric surgery and plastic and reconstructive surgery,
neurosurgery, and urology), ENT, pediatrics, physical
medicine and rehabilitation, psychiatry, public health, pul-
monology, radiology (nuclear medicine, neuroradiology,
and radiology), and stomatology.
Data analysis
Descriptive statistical analysis was used to examine the
distribution of the variables, including non-answers. The
independent t test and analysis of variance (ANOVA)
were used to examine group differences on the basis of
the proportion of “yes” answers for each dependent vari-
able. A multivariate logistic regression was conducted to
evaluate the moderator effect of years of practice and
medical specialty in the relationship between sector of
activity and quality of care using the Process Macro [21].
A General Linear Model (GLM) Univariate Analysis was
conducted to assess the moderator effect of medical spe-
cialty testing interaction effects. Since some of the com-
binations of the factorial design showed a small number
of cases, a non-parametric method (bootstrap) was also
used to validate the results obtained by the parametric
procedure. Some of the initial medical specialties had to
be excluded in order to avoid empty combinations in the
factorial design. Post hoc probing was conducted to
interpret significant interactions utilizing estimates
obtained from the fitted models [22] and also to achieve
plotting interactions. All analyses were conducted using
SPSS (version 23).
Results
Descriptive statistics
The final sample comprised 2063 physicians who had
valid data according to the main inclusion criteria, work-
ing exclusively in the public or private sector (Table 2).
Most respondents were general practitioners and work-
ing exclusively in the public sector. The percentage of
younger doctors was slightly higher. As regards
dependent variables, results were as follows: 17.3%
reported more refusals of innovative treatments, 64.9%
regular shortages of supplies, 30.6% regular shortages of
drugs, 23.8% greater pressure to choose less costly treat-
ments, 15.6% greater pressure to limit the prescription
of certain drugs, and 48.9% less favorable conditions for
medical residencies (Table 2).
Group comparisons
A comparison of means between sectors showed that
they significantly affected physicians’ evaluation of qual-
ity of care in several indicators: usual shortage of
supplies (t (1054) = 14.379, p < .001) (DV2), shortage of
drugs (t (938) = 4.809, p < .001) (DV3), pressure to
choose cheaper treatments (t (1049) = 3.001, p = .003)
(DV4), pressure to limit the prescription of certain drugs
(t (1276) = 6.044, p < .001) (DV5), and less favorable
conditions for medical residencies (t (684) = − 2.439,
p = .015) (DV6). Except for the latter, there were more
“yes” answers among physicians working exclusively
in the public sector (see 1st step, Table 3).
Significant differences were found among physicians
working exclusively at public hospitals and in primary
care in all dependent variables (p < .05). Physicians work-
ing exclusively in public hospitals mentioned refusal of
innovative treatments (t (786) = − 6.663, p < .001) (DV1),
drug shortages (t (751) = − 10.914, p < .001) (DV3) and,
with a smaller difference, less favorable conditions for
medical residencies (t (554) = − 1.996, p = .023) (DV6).
Physicians working in primary care services mentioned
shortages of equipment (t (815) = 6.893, p < .001) (DV2),
pressure to choose cheaper treatments (t (820) = 4.869,
p < .001) (DV4), and pressure not to prescribe certain
drugs (t (910) = 4.741, p < .001) (DV5).
Significant differences were found among physicians
working in the private sector only regarding refusal of
innovative treatments (F (2, 116) = 3.682, p = .028) (DV1)
and, to a lesser extent, less favorable conditions for med-
ical residencies (F (2, 48) = 3.299, p = .045) (DV6). There
were fewer “yes” answers in both indicators among
physicians working in clinics (see 1nd step, Table 3).
Moderator analysis
A moderator effect of years of practice was tested to
provide a more detailed understanding of the differences
between working in the public or private sector (Fig. 1).
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The interaction effect between sector and years of
practice had a significant effect on refusal of innova-
tive treatments (B = − 0.005, Z = − 2.396, p = .017, 95%
CI = − 0.008, − 0.001) (DV1), pressure not to prescribe cer-
tain drugs (B = 0.005, Z = 2.884, p = .004, 95% CI = 0.002,
0.009) (DV5) and less favorable conditions for medical
residencies (B = − 0.004, Z = − 2.075, p = .038, 95%
CI = − 0.007, − 0.001) (DV6) (Table 4).
Figure 2 shows that refusal of innovative treatments
tended to be reported more by older physicians in the pri-
vate sector and younger physicians in the public sector. Post
hoc tests revealed a significant effect of years of practice only
in the public sector (B= − 0.003, Z= − 3.941, p= .000, 95%
CI =− 0.004, − 0.001).
As presented in Fig. 3, the pressure not to prescribe
certain drugs was not affected by years of practice in the
public sector (p > .05). A significant negative effect was
found in the private sector and was less likely to occur
among older physicians (B = − 0.006, Z = − 3.121, p = .002,
95% CI = − 0.009, − 0.002) (Fig. 3).
In contrast, less favorable conditions for medical residen-
cies were not affected by years of practice in the private sec-
tor (p > .05), while a significant negative effect was observed
Table 2 Descriptive statistics
Analyses variables and categories N %
Independent
variable
Sector of
activity
Exclusive in public 1209 58.6
Exclusive in private 854 41.4
Total 2063 100.0
Exclusive
in public
Primary
healthcare
509 42.1
Public
hospitals
634 52.4
Non
answer
66 5.5
Total 1209 100.0
Exclusive
in private
Small-size
offices
274 32.1
Clinics 230 26.9
Hospital 79 9.3
Non
answer
271 31.7
Total 854 100.0
Moderator
variables
Years of
practice
Up to 12 years 644 31.2
13–25 years 473 22.9
26–39 years 520 25.2
Over 40 years 426 20.0
Total 2063 100.0
Medical
specialty
Anesthesiology 59 2.9
Cardiology 28 1.4
Dermatology 17 .8
Gastroenterology 23 1.1
General practice/
family medicine
498 24.1
General surgery 110 5.3
Internal medicine 132 6.4
Neurology 16 .8
Obstetrics and
gynecology
78 3.8
Oncology 38 1.8
Ophthalmology 41 2.0
Orthopedics 49 2.4
Other surgical
specialties
54 2.6
Otorhinolaryngology 29 1.4
Pediatrics 109 5.3
Physical medicine
and rehabilitation
26 1.3
Psychiatry 64 3.1
Public Health 28 1.4
Pulmonology 31 1.5
Radiology 36 1.7
Stomatology 30 1.5
Table 2 Descriptive statistics (Continued)
Analyses variables and categories N %
Non answer 567 27.5
Total 2063 100.0
Dependent
variables—quality
of care
DV1 No 1465 82.7
Yes 307 17.3
Total 1772 100.0
DV2 No 639 35.1
Yes 1184 64.9
Total 1823 100.0
DV3 No 1149 69.4
Yes 506 30.6
Total 1655 100.0
DV4 No 1384 76.2
Yes 432 23.8
Total 1816 100.0
DV5 No 1819 84.4
Yes 336 15.6
Total 2155 100.0
DV6 No 747 51.1
Yes 716 48.9
Total 1463 100.0
Notes: (1) Sums of subject numbers for the dependent variables are not
always equal because of missing data; percentages are based on number of
subjects for whom data were available; (2) DV1—refusal of innovative
treatments; DV2—regular shortage of work supplies; DV3—shortage of drugs;
DV4—pressure to choose less-expensive treatments; DV5—pressure not to
prescribe specific drugs; DV6—inferior medical training
Correia et al. Human Resources for Health  (2017) 15:82 Page 6 of 12
in the public sector (B= − 0.003, Z= − 4.219, p < .001, 95%
CI = − 0.005, − 0.002) (Fig. 4).
Regarding regular shortages of supplies and drugs, only
the main effect was significant, as years of practice did not
have a moderating effect (p < .05) (Table 4). Older phy-
sicians made less mention of regular shortages of sup-
plies in both the private and public sectors (B = − 0.003,
Z = − 2.594, p = .01, 95% CI = − 0.006, − 0.001 and B = −
0.002, Z = − 3.238, p = .001, 95% CI = − 0.003, − 0.001,
respectively). Drug shortages also produced fewer “yes”
answers from older physicians and this significant effect
occurred in both sectors (B = − 0.005, Z= − 2.622, p = .009,
95% CI = − 0.008, − 0.001 and B = − 0.003, Z = − 4.821,
p < .001, 95% CI = − 0.004, − 0.002, private and public
respectively).
Moderation by medical specialty was also tested (Fig. 1).
The interaction between sector and medical specialty had
a significant effect on refusal of innovative treatments (F
(11, 595) = 1.988, p = .035) (DV1) and shortages of drugs
(F (11, 520) = 4.206, p < .001) (DV3) (Table 5).
There was a significant difference between the two
sectors for refusal of innovative treatments in stomatol-
ogy (p = .024) and radiology (p = .004). On the other
hand, the answer “yes” was more frequent for oral
Table 3 Comparisons of quality of care between groups (t-test and one-way ANOVA)
Sector of activity DV1 DV2 DV3 DV4 DV5 DV6
Meana Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean
1st step
Public 0.153 0.731 0.300 0.262 0.200 0.435
Private 0.134 0.228 0.110 0.158 0.058 0.571
Model test t (1026) = 0.683 t (1054) = 14.379*** t (938) = 4.809*** t (1049) = 3.001** t (1276) = 6.044*** t (684) = − 2.436*
2nd step
Public Primary
healthcare
0.065 0.847 0.091 0.351 0.267 0.385
Public hospitals 0.234 0.637 0.437 0.201 0.143 0.471
Model test t (786) = − 6.663*** t (815) = 6.893*** t (751) = − 10.914*** t (820) = 4.869*** t (910) = 4.741*** t (554) = − 1.996*
Private Small-size offices 0.286 0.125 0.100 0.161 0.056 0.636
Clinics 0.074 0.333 0.129 0.239 0.061 0.308
Hospital 0.167 0.188 0.133 0.194 0.100 0.750
Model test F (2, 116) = 3.682* F (2, 115) = 2.768 F (2, 78) = 0.0660 F (2, 105) = 1.609 F (2, 201) = 0.514 F (2, 48) = 3.299*
aMean = proportion of answer “yes”
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001
Table 4 Multivariate logistic regression model with the moderator effect of years of practice on quality of care
DV1 DV2 DV3 DV4 DV5 DV6
Exclusive in publica 1.556 1.160* − 0.104 − 0.115 − 0.814 0.571
(0.857) (0.580) (0.714) (0.640) (0.710) (0.692)
Years of practice (exclusive in private) 0.002 − 0.003** − 0.005** − 0.002 − 0.006** 0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Exclusive in public * Years of practiceb − 0.005* 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.005** − 0.004*
(0.002) 0.001 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Constant − 2.742** 0.212 − 0.229 − 0.775 − 0.522 0.172
(0.843) (0.563) (0.703) (0.626) (0.694) (0.645)
Model LL = 18.316*** 186.426*** 57.636*** 13.628** 52.207*** 24.265***
Post hoc tests
Years of practice (exclusive in public) − 0.003*** − 0.002** − 0.003*** − 0.002** − 0.002 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Non-standardized coefficients and standard errors (in brackets) are reported
aExclusive private (baseline)
bInteraction effect
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001
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medicine in the private sector and radiology in the pub-
lic sector (Fig. 5). Shortages of drugs were significantly
different between the sectors in various specialties:
physical medicine and rehabilitation (p = .001), internal
medicine (p = .020), general practice/family medicine
(p = .020), general surgery (p = .006), ophthalmology
(p = .038), and psychiatry (p < .001). With the exception
of general practice/family medicine, the answer “yes” was
more frequent in the public sector for all the other med-
ical specialties (Fig. 6).
Discussion
The understanding of the effects of adjustment programs
like those of Greece, Portugal, Ireland, and Cyprus fills an
important gap in the literature on policy responses in
Europe to the recent economic crisis. Conclusions result
Fig. 2 Interaction between sector and years of practice in refusal of innovative treatments
Fig. 3 Interaction between sector and years of practice in pressure not to prescribe certain drugs
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in non-convergent evidence and therefore further analysis
is required. The framework for this study was built on two
overlooked assumptions. First, the understanding of the
effects of the crisis on health systems performance is still
limited given that few analyses have been conducted on
quality of care as compared to efficiency and access.
Second, looking at healthcare delivery is likely to reveal
differences in relation to the analysis of planning or
purchasing due to workplace-level contingencies. This led
us to assess, based on the experience of those who provide
care, whether structural reforms impacted the care deliv-
ery process and the quality of services.
Accordingly, we suggest that the reforms made under
the Portuguese adjustment program had negative effects
on the quality of care, namely in terms of shortages of
work resources, less favorable conditions for medical resi-
dencies, and to a lesser extent, more administrative inter-
ference in clinical decisions. Reports of negative effects
were consistently higher among physicians working exclu-
sively for the NHS, which illustrates that the public sector
was the main target of health-related austerity measures,
even though these were expected to apply to all types of
providers without exception.
Our findings show also that the austerity measures were
felt differently in the public and private sectors. Results in
the NHS suggest insufficient resources and greater con-
straints on physicians’ individual decision-making (e.g.,
equipment shortages and administrative interference in
clinical decisions). In the private sector, the main outcome
of reforms was the negative impact on medical residencies
due to overworked residents and to less time for tutors to
provide training. Constraints in both sectors require further
studies for a better understanding of its effects on clinical
autonomy and training and ultimately on health outcomes.
Looking at public and private services, physicians in
public hospitals reported more denials of innovative
treatments, more drug shortages, and less favorable con-
ditions for medical residencies. Primary care physicians
reported more equipment shortages and administrative
interference in medical decisions. In the private sector,
physicians in small offices reported more refusals of
innovative treatments than those in clinics and private
hospitals, while the latter complained more deterioration
in medical residency.
The argument that physicians’ experiences depend on
the sector of activity is reinforced when we analyzed the
Fig. 4 Interaction between sector and years of practice in deterioration in medical training
Table 5 GLM Univariate Analysis with the moderator effect on the relationship between medical specialty and quality of care
DV1 DV2 DV3 DV4 DV5 DV6
Sector F (1, 595) = 0.842 F (1, 609) = 68.809*** F (1, 520) = 23.010*** F (1, 606) = 0.006 F (1, 764) = 0.571 F (1, 382) = 2.038
Medical specialty F (11, 595) = 2.701** F (11, 609) = 3.447*** F (11, 520) = 0.898 F (11, 606) = 1.130 F (11, 764) = 1.143 F (11, 382) = 0.927
Interaction between sector and medical specialty F (11, 595) = 1.988* F (11, 609) = 1.370 F (11, 520) = 4.206*** F (11, 606) = 0.993 F (11, 764) = 0.822 F (11, 382) = 1.353
GLM General Linear Model
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001
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moderating effects of two key factors in medical hier-
archy (years of practice and specialty). The reporting of
denial of innovative treatments decreases with seniority
in the public sector, while it increases in the private
sector. Administrative interference was perceived as
higher by less-experienced physicians in the private
sector, while in the public sector years of service made
no difference as to the pressure to limit the prescription
of certain drugs. More less-experienced physicians in the
public sector mentioned less favorable conditions for
medical residencies, while this trend was not found in
the private sector. As to differences between medical
specialties, refusal of innovative treatments was more
reported by stomatologists in the private sector than
those in the public sector and by radiologists in the pub-
lic sector than those in the private sector. Shortage of
drugs was more reported by public-sector physiologists,
internists, surgeons, ophthalmologists, and psychiatrists
than by these specialists in the private sector, while gen-
eral practitioners in the private sector reported it more
than their colleagues in the NHS.
Our study shows that physicians in public and private
sectors and within each sector have different perceptions,
depending on their specific characteristics, of the impact
of the same policy responses.
A number of potential long-term effects that this empir-
ical study cannot address are associated with these results.
One in particular is here uncovered to highlight possible
Fig. 5 Interaction between sector and medical specialty in refusal of innovative treatments
Fig. 6 Interaction between sector activity and medical specialty on shortage of drugs
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directions for research. Lower quality healthcare services
presumably affect health professionals’ and patients’ indi-
vidual choices. Given that the influence of trust in individ-
uals’ decisions is well understood [23, 24], the understudied
link is the effects of lower quality on the undermining of
trust relationships in health. The issue is to know how
lower quality affect professionals’ and patients’ indi-
vidual choices and whether these choices can affect
health systems structurally.
As to the NHS, the quality-trust link builds on the
moral contract between authorities, citizens, and profes-
sionals. Professionals feeling that they are not being given
the conditions they need for their work and patients ques-
tioning the need for higher taxation to fund access to
services that are less trustworthy can translate into the
growth of the private market in parallel to the public
sector. As to the private sector, the quality-trust link is a
key element in market competition. Greater pressure is
put on the supply side in investment in communication
strategies and patient-centered care approaches. Conse-
quently, it is relevant to discuss possible increases in
households’ spending and growing exposure to deregula-
tion of the health labor market.
Limitations
We were unable to establish the representativeness of
the respondents, even though the total number of over
3000 is high. Also, the instrument does not permit a
clear assessment of the moderating effect of physicians’
years of practice and specialties, selected as proxy of
internal stratification of the medical profession. More
empirical in-depth research into this issue is needed.
Lastly, the measurements of quality of care delivery
reflect physicians’ personal experiences and views and
are therefore not comparable to those of health workers.
Conclusion
The aim of this article was to add to the understanding
of the effects of policy responses to the 2008 crisis on
health system performance in Europe. In Portugal, there
is an institutional discourse that the health system
adapted well to cost containment [25]. By focusing on
the perceptions of professionals of the effects of the cri-
sis on their work and on the quality of care, we offer a
complementary contribution. Also, our findings show
that the outcomes of policy responses may not have
been the same in all national health care systems, there-
fore requiring context-sensitive analyses.
The added value of an analysis built on a macro (polit-
ical)-micro (organizational) link is likely to reveal a dif-
ferent reality from that showed by general statistics,
which do not reflect concrete experiences. It also shows
the non-linearity between policy setting and expected
outcomes, which is particularly relevant in assessing the
effects of austerity measures. The fact that only physi-
cians were surveyed and the lack of standardized data
on physicians in Portugal are limitations that further
research can help mitigate.
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